(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Atlanta Campaign and Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, Georgia"

J84 

I 29.21 

At 6/942 







e 1942 



I |^JM•:^Q< 



The Atlanta Campaign 

and Kennesaw Mountain 

National Battlefield Park, Georgia 




A Federal battery engaged in drill, using a 20-pourider Parrott gun, 
the most effective type of ordnance employed during the Atlanta 
Campaign. Wartime photograph. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.) 



THE COVER 

The cover is a reproduction of a wartime sketch 
illustrating the Confederates preparing for the 
defense of Kennesaw Mountain. In order to 
mount batteries on the crest of the mountain it was 
necessary, due to the steepness of the slope, to pull 
the guns by hand. This type of work was not 
unusual for both armies during the Atlanta Cam- 
paign, which in many places was fought over 
rugged terrain. Reproduction of this sketch is by 
courtesy and permission of the U. S. Army Signal 
Corps. 



Contents 

Page 

The Eve of the Atlanta Campaign 3 

Terrain and Factors Affecting the Atlanta 

Campaign 3 

The Atlanta Campaign 5 

Ringgold Gap 5 

Rocky Face Ridge 5 

Resaca 6 

Cassville 6 

New Hope Church 7 

Battle of Kennesaw Mountain 9 

Close of the Atlanta Campaign 11 

Andrews' Raid 13 

Chickamauga and Chattanooga National 

Military Park 15 

Atlanta Campaign National Marker Sites . 1 5 
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield 

Park 15 




UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
Harold L. Ickes, Secretary 

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE - Newton B. Drury, Director 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C ... Price 10 cents 



The Atlanta Campaign and Kennesaw 
Mountain National Battlefield Park 



"Brothers of a common stock, of equal courage 
and tenacity, animated by convictions which they 
passionately held, they did on both sides all that 
it was possible for soldiers to do, fighting their way 
to a mutual respect which is the solid foundation 
for a renewal of more than the old regard and 
affection." Thus wrote General Cox, a participant 
in the War between the States, of the men who 
engaged in the Atlanta Campaign. 

The Eve of the Atlanta Campaign 

During the summer of 1863 heavy blows had fallen 
on Confederate hopes. Grant captured Vicksburg 
on July 4, and the whole length of the Mississippi 
River passed under Federal control. Food supplies 
and reinforcements furnished the Confederates in 
the main theatre of war east of the river were there- 
after cut off. On this same July 4, Lee was in full 
retreat after the crucial Battle of Gettysburg, which 
ended the last Confederate invasion of the North. 
The war in the West now centered around the 
Federal effort to control Chattanooga, which, after 
severe setbacks, was successful. In the Battle of 
Chickamauga, fought a short distance south of 
Chattanooga, on September 19-20, the Federal 
Army was defeated. It was forced to retreat hur- 
riedly to Chattanooga where it was almost sur- 
rounded on the east and south by Confederates who 
occupied Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, 
and the Chattanooga Valley. All but the most 
circuitous Federal lines of supply, based on Nash- 
ville, were interrupted, and the besieged army was 
soon in dire straits. Starvation threatened until 
reinforcements arrived and an effective supply line 
was established. New leaders were sent to assume 
command of the Federal Army — Grant, Sherman, 
Sheridan, and Hooker — and in hard fighting, 
November 23-25, the Confederates were driven 
from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge 
and forced back from Chattanooga. 



The Federal forces were now in possession of a 
strategically strong base, from which they effective- 
ly could disrupt industry and communications in 
the very heart of the Confederacy. A successful 
invasion of Georgia would not only deprive the 
South of a rich source of food and ordnance, but 
would lower both the military and the civilian 
morale, and remove the last possibility of European 
states recognizing the Confederacy. 

By May 1, 1864, Gen. William Tecumseh Sher- 
man had assembled at Chattanooga approximately 
100,000 men, well equipped, with 254 guns. Op- 
posing him at Dalton, Ga., 34 miles distant, was 
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston with about 50,000 men, 
only fairly well equipped, with 187 guns. Soon 
after the campaign started, Johnston's forces were 
increased to about 60,000 men. The Confederates 
were less abundantly supplied with ammunition 
than were the Federals. Owing to the compara- 
tive size of the armies, Johnston was on the defen- 
sive, but fighting over terrain well adapted for defen- 
sive tactics in territory friendly to the Confederacy. 

Terrain and Factors Affecting the 
Atlanta Campaign 

The Federal Army was based on Chattanooga, 
and the Confederate Army on Dalton, Ga., during 
the winter of 1863-64. Atlanta, 120 miles from 
Chattanooga, and 85 miles from Dalton, was 
Johnston's base for supplies. This city, full of 
machine shops, foundries, and arsenals, after 
Johnston's army, was Sherman's main objective. 
Its defense was the crucial task of the opposing 
Confederate force. Grant's instructions to Sher- 
man in the spring of 1864 directed him "to move 
against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get 
into the interior of the enemy's country as far as 
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against 
their resources ..." Atlanta, a large town for 
the time, was situated at the juncture of several 




William Tecumseh Sherman, commander of the Federal Jorces in the 

Atlanta Campaign, was one oj the ablest northern generals developed 

by the war. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.) 



Strategic railroads. The Western and Atlantic 
Railroad, running from Atlanta through Dalton to 
Chattanooga, was the line of communication of 
both armies; one reaching Richmond, Va., from 
Atlanta by way of Danville, was a supply line be- 
tween the Confederate States and the line of com- 
munication between Johnston and Lee; another 
ran from Atlanta through the heart of Georgia to 
the coast at Savannah; and still another connected 
Atlanta with Montgomery, Ala. 

Between Chattanooga and Atlanta the country 
was generally wooded, and, except the area be- 
tween the Oostanaula and the Etowah Rivers, was 
rugged and hilly. In front of Dalton a ridge about 
30 miles long ran in a north-south direction and 
could be crossed by an army in only two places, at 
Mill Creek Gap where the railway passed through 
it, and at Snake Creek Gap, 14 miles farther south. 
In front of Marietta were Brush Mountain, 
Kennesaw Mountain, Lost Mountain, and Pine 
Mountain, and other rugged hiUs. Interposing 
their courses across the theatre of action from 
Dalton to Atlanta were the Oostanaula, the 
Etowah, and the Chattahoochee Rivers. All the 
roads were of the poorest kind. 



Sherman described the Atlanta Campaign in 
these words: "We were generally in a wooded 
country, and, though our lines were deployed 
according to tactics, the men generally fought in 
strong skirmish lines, taking advantage of the 
shape of the ground, and of every cover. We were 
generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken 
countries the 'defensive' had a positive advantage 
over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and 
always knew the ground to their immediate front; 
whereas we, their assailants, had to grope our way 
over unknown ground, and generally found a 
cleared field or prepared entanglements that held 
us for a time under a close and withering fire. 
Rarely did the opposing lines in compact order 
come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach 
Tree Creek and Atlanta, the lines did become 
commingled, the men fought individually in every 
possible style, more frequently with the musket 
clubbed than with the bayonet." 

Military critics considered the Atlanta Campaign 
a model of military strategy, and they have found 
little in it to criticize. One critic sums up the 
campaign in these words: "Except in attacking the 
Kennesaw Mountain on the 27th of June, the 
character of Sherman's operations was, throughout, 
the same. To protect his main line from a counter- 
attack, he left a force intrenched across it. He 
then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength 
sufficient to cope with the whole army of the enemy, 
and directed it by a circuit off the main line, upon 
the Confederate rear. In every case the operation 
was successful, obliging Johnston forthwith to 
abandon his strongest positions, and to retreat." 
Another critic comments: "It is rather curious to 
note that Johnston made no effort to defend the 
rivers across his line of retreat by taking positions 
behind them; and that he appeared rather to 
prefer having a river at his back, as at Resaca and 
at the Chattahoochee. He was careful to provide 
plenty of bridges for his retreat, and by destroying 
them at the right time, he hindered the pursuit. 

"Both hostile armies in this campaign made con- 
stant use of fieldworks. It was only by means of 
intrenching that Sherman was able to hold John- 
ston with a small force in front, while he dispatched 
the bulk of his command upon the wide turning- 
movements." 

Writing many years after the war. General 
Sherman said of his adversary in the Atlanta 
Campaign up to the Battle of Peach Tree Creek: 



"No officer or soldier who ever served under me 
will question the generalship of Joseph E.Johnston. 
His retreats were timely, in good order, and he 
left nothing behind." 

The Atlanta Campaign was only one phase of a 
gigantic plan of battle which it was hoped would 
end the war. The line of battle may be said to 
have extended from Fort Monroe in Virginia on 
the Chesapeake Bay across northern Virginia to 
the Rapidan River, hence curving southwestward 
through West Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and 
western North Carolina, northwest Georgia, and 
the middle of Alabama to the Gulf of Mexico. 
Grant's army facing Lee in northern Virginia 
constituted the center, and Sherman's army at 
Chattanooga, the right, of this long offensive line. 
The might of the Federal Army was concentrated 
under Grant and Sherman, just as that of the 
Confederate Army was concentrated under Lee 
and Johnston. The great offensive was planned 
to open on May 4, in both Virginia and Georgia. 
Sherman was to drive straight into the heart of 
the South. 

The Atlanta Campaign 

RINGGOLD GAP 

The Federal Army wintering in Chattanooga 
had maintained an advance position at Ringgold 
Gap which served to prevent surprise attacks. On 
May 7, Sherman moved through this gap in the 
initial phase of the Atlanta Campaign. 

Ringgold Gap National Marker Site, south 
of Ringgold, Ga., on United States Highway 41, 
has for its primary purpose the orientation of the 
traveler who is following Sherman's route. A 
bronze relief map is mounted here illustrating the 
terrain over which fighting occurred in 1864. The 
locations of the major engagements of the Atlanta 
Campaign are shown and a brief narrative of the 
campaign is given. 

ROCKY FACE RIDGE 

As Sherman advanced from Ringgold Gap, he 
found Confederates strongly intrenched on Rocky 
Face Ridge north of Dalton. Realizing the 
strength of this position, Sherman determined to 
march around it and threaten the Confederate 
line of communication, the Western and Atlantic 




Joseph Eggleston Johnston was commander oj the Conjederate Army 
of the Tennessee and the Army of Mississippi which opposed Sherman 
during the Atlanta Campaign. He was the fourth ranking general 
in the Confederate Army; a masterful tactician and a worthy 
opponent for any enemy. Johnston was replaced by Hood before the 
battles around Atlanta were fought. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.) 



Railroad. He believed that such a move would 
force his opponents to retire in order to protect 
vital communications to their rear, and that they 
would have to offer battle under circumstances 
more favorable to him. While a Federal column 
was flanking the Rocky Face Ridge position, by 
way of Snake Creek Gap, 14 miles to the right, 
Sherman made several attempts to force a passage 
over the ridge and through Mill Creek Gap in 
order to divert Confederate attention from his 
important flank movement. 

The Federal maneuvers were efficiently executed, 
and, as a result, the Confederates on May 12 aban- 
doned Rocky Face Ridge, retiring to Resaca. 

Rocky Face Ridge National Marker Site, 
10.9 miles south of Ringgold, on United States 
Highway 41, at Mill Creek Gap, is one of the 
points where Sherman attempted to pass through 
the ridge. The relief map displayed at this site 
portrays the physical difficulties which confronted 
the Federal Army and outlines the military action. 
The visitor readily can appreciate the advantages 




enjoyed by troops intrenched on such a command- 
ing ridge and in the narrow gap over and through 
which Sherman was attempting to pass. Confed- 
erate fortifications are visible at many points along 
Rocky Face Ridge. 

RESACA 

As Sherman approached Resaca he found the 
Confederates intrenched on a semicircle of hills 
about the town with the Oostanaula River to 
their rear. The Federal troops assaulted at several 
points along the Confederate line. 

While the Federal attacks were attended with 
heavy losses, they enabled Sherman to secure 
excellent artillery positions which commanded the 
railroad crossing of the Oostanaula River and 
exposed the Confederates to serious danger. At 
the same time a Federal column was crossing the 
Oostanaula River below Resaca at Lay's Ferry to 
threaten the Confederate line of communications. 

The Federal bombardment of the bridges and 
the flanking movement across the river forced the 
Confederates to retire, leaving Sherman in posses- 
sion of Georgia north of the Oostanaula River. 

Resaca National Marker Site, 12.6 miles 
south of Dalton, and north of Resaca, on United 
States Highway 41, was a short distance inside the 
Confederate fortifications which encircled the 
town. The bronze relief map mounted at this 



Atlanta-Chattanooga Highway looking south toward AIill Creek 

Gap in Rocky Face Ridge. Wartime photograph. {Signal Corps, 

U. S. Army.) 

site illustrates the important troop movements 
which resulted in the Confederate withdrawal. 
A road north of the marker site runs east to the 
cemetery where the Confederate dead were in- 
terred. 

CASSVILLE 

Retiring south from Resaca, the Confederates 
on May 17 halted 3.5 miles north of Adairsville 
and sought a strong defensive position from which 
they could offer battle. Finding no terrain strong 
enough for a stand against the numerically superior 
Federal Army, the Confederates withdrew to 
Cassville. As Sherman followed, a portion of his 
troops marched directly toward Cassville, while 
other columns were sent through Kingston. 
Johnston thought this presented an opportunity 
to destroy an isolated Federal column. His attack, 
executed on May 19, failed, however, chiefly 
because the Federal columns were within support- 
ing distance of each other. 

The Confederates then withdrew to a curving 
ridge east and south of Cassville. But certain of 
Johnston's corps commanders felt that the Con- 
federates here were too exposed to artillery fire. 
Johnston therefore withdrew on the night of May 
19, taking up a position on a range just south of 
Cartersville and the Etowah River. 

Cassville National Marker Site is situated 



.'xms&ucjmUt^ 







3-* 



This reproduction of a wartime sketch by Theodore R. Davis in 
Harper's Weekly for June 11, 1864, illustrates the position 
of Osterhaus' division of the Federal Army on Bald Hill at Resaca 
and the shelling oj the railroad bridge across the Oostanaula River. 



1 mile south of Cassville, on United States Highway 
41, and east of the ridge on which the Confederates 
intrenched on May 19. The fortifications on the 
ridge are well preserved. The relief map on the 
site indicates troop positions and movements which 
culminated in the Confederate withdrawal. 

NEW HOPE CHURCH 

As A YOUNG OFFICER, Sherman had traveled over 
the Allatoona Pass and remembered it as a for- 
midable defensive position, so again he decided 
to use flanking tactics. His intention was to move 
on Atlanta, and on May 23, his entire army left 
the line of the railroad and moved to the southwest. 
The country was almost in a state of nature, with 
few or no roads. Johnston soon comprehended 
the meaning of this move and sent his troops toward 
New Hope Church, 4 miles north of Dallas, from 
which several roads radiated toward Atlanta. 
Arriving here on May 25, he assumed a position 



A line oj Federal skirmishers advancing toward Resaca. This un- 
usual sketch illustrates clearly the manner in which skirmishers 
ordinarily advanced ahead oj the main body and is typical oj many 
actions in Georgia during the Atlanta Campaign. Wartime sketch 
by Theodore R Flavin in Harper's Weekly, June 11, 1864. 



protecting the vital roads. Late that afternoon a 
portion of the Federal Army appeared and made 
a series of desperate but unsuccessful assaults. 

Now that the railroad had been abandoned, the 
problem of feeding the Federal troops was a major 
one, for supplies had to be hauled by wagon from 
the Western and Atlantic Railroad over narrow 
dirt roads which heavy rainfalls had converted into 
quagmires. Having flanked the Confederates from 
their position at Allatoona, Sherman now deter- 
mined to move back to the railroad in order to 
reestablish a dependable line of supplies. Despite 
Confederate vigilance, superior man power en- 
abled Sherman to reach the railroad. By June 6 
he had concentrated his troops in the vicinity of 
Acworth, 12 miles north of Marietta. 

New Hope Church National Marker Site is 
located on Georgia State Highway 92, 13 miles 
southwest of Acworth, at the important road 
junction for which both armies were contending. 
The relief map mounted at this point delineates 
the troop movements which resulted in the Federal 
flank movement around the Confederate Army to 
the Western and Atlantic Railroad at Acworth. 

Portions of the Confederate fortifications are 
visible west of the marker site. North of the 
marker site is New Hope Church Cemetery. The 
original church which stood here during the battle 
has been replaced. New Hope Church is 17 miles 
west of Marietta on State Highway 120. 





8 



Reproduction of a section of the Cyclorama painting of the Battle of 

Atlanta illustrating the desperate nature of the fighting in vicinity of 

that city. Courtesy: Department of Parks, Atlanta. (Reeves 

Studio Photo.) 




BATTLE OF KENNESAW MOUNTAIN 

When Sherman moved from New Hope Church, 
Johnston was compelled to follow on a parallel line. 
This shift put the Confederates in front of Mari- 
etta, in a battle line extending from Lost Mountain 
across Kennesaw Mountain to Brush Mountain, a 
distance of about 12 miles. Pine Mountain, an 
isolated eminence in front of this line, also was 
occupied. This position covered Marietta, the 
Western and Atlantic Railroad, which at this 
point passed between Kennesaw and Brush 
Mountains, and the bridges across the Chatta- 
hoochee River which would be indispensable if the 
Confederates were compelled to withdraw. Pro- 
ceeding east from New Hope Church, Lost Moun- 
tain is approximately 7}^ miles, Kennesaw Moun- 
tain 14 miles, and Brush Mountain 17 miles distant. 

Several days of rainy weather checked military 
operations. By June 14, however, a portion of the 
Federal Army had worked close to the Confederates 
on Pine Mountain. Generals Johnston, Hardee, 
and Polk rode to the summit of Pine Mountain 
that day to observe the enemy's line, and while 
there a battery of Federal guns, three-quarters of a 
mile distant, fired, one of the shots killing Polk 
instantly. The Confederate line of 10 miles or 
more was too long for the number of available 
troops, and Johnston soon concentrated them on 
Kennesaw Mountain. 

The main Federal force now advanced toward 
Kennesaw Mountain, and as the Confederate posi- 
tion was neared, Sherman's men spread out on a 
line paralleling it and extending south. There was 
continuous skirmishing, but the operations were 
hindered by heavy rains which converted streams 
into torrents and roads into ribbons of mud. 

Discerning that the Federals were attempting to 
envelop his flank by the movement to the south, 
Johnston moved Hood from the right to the left of 
his line in an effort to strike the Federals as they 
maneuvered for position. On the morning of 
June 22, Federal troops advanced toward Marietta 
along the Powder Springs Road. By noon they 
had reached the intersection of the Macland and 
Powder Springs Roads, situated on a ridge which 
offered a strong defensive position. 




This interesting wartime photograph was taken Jrom Conjederale 
trenches clearly seen in joreground and right background, looking 
toward the little town of Resaca, Ga. Here are seen the road leading 
south into the town, to the left the Western and Atlantic Railroad, 
and beyond the town the railroad bridge over the Oostanaula River. 
(Signal Corps, U. S. Army.) 



The Federal troops were massed in the woods 
around the road intersection, only a portion of 
them intrenching. During the morning, Hood had 
concentrated his troops on the Powder Springs 
Road, and in the afternoon they were ordered to 
attack. From Confederate prisoners it had been 
learned that such a movement was intended, and 
the Federals had a little time to prepare for the 
assault. It began at 5:30 p. m., the Federal skir- 
mish line being quickly engulfed, but failed to 
reach the main line owing to heavy artillery fire. 

Prior to the Confederate assault. Hooker, in 
command of the Federal column, established his 
headquarters in the home of Valentine Kolb, 
which stands on the Powder Springs Road, 4.5 
miles southwest of Marietta. Many of the fortifi- 
cations erected during this engagement are also 
still in existence. 

Indecisive skirmishing continued for several days. 
Sherman had the choice of making a frontal 
assault, or attempting another turning movement. 
The heavy rains and the all but impassable roads 
would make the turning movement especially 
difficult. Furthermore, the troops were tired of 
marching and wanted to fight. Lincoln, running 



for reelection, needed a Federal victory to bolster 
his policy of continuing the war. If the frontal 
assault succeeded, all military resistance in north 
Georgia might be ended; if it failed, the flanking 
movement still could be attempted. These con- 
siderations determined Sherman to risk a frontal 
attack. 

The assault was made at two separate points 
against the Confederate center on the morning of 
June 27. One column struck south of Kennesaw 
Mountain along the Burnt Hickory Road. An- 
other was hurled against a salient south of the 
Dallas Road, defended by General Cheatham, and 
known now as Cheatham's Hill. Eight thousand 
troops were sent against the Confederates at 
Cheatham's Hill, and 5,500 at the point south of 
Kennesaw Mountain. At Cheatham's Hill the 
Federals lost 1,580 men in killed, wounded, and 
captured, against slightly over 200 in Confederate 
losses; in the attack south of Kennesaw Mountain, 
the Federals lost about 600 men, including 30 
officers, against about half that number of Con- 
federates. The attack thus failed with heavy losses. 
Military critics charge Sherman with having made 
one of his few mistakes in ordering the frontal 
attack. 

Realizing that the Confederate position could be 
carried only by a tremendous sacrifice of men, 
Sherman resumed the flanking tactics which he had 
employed so often. A Federal column was ex- 



lO 



tended far beyond the Confederate left, and 
Johnston's Une of communications to Atlanta was 
threatened. Consequently, on the night of July 2, 
the Confederates withdrew, thus ending the Battle 
of Kennesaw Mountain. 

CLOSE OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN 

At Smyrna Station, 7 miles south of Marietta, 
the Confederates took up a defensive position and 
intrenched. The Federal advance and develop- 
ment of this position on July 4 caused the Con- 
federates again to retire and take up a fortified line 
just north of the Chattahoochee River, extending 
from the general vicinity of the present Bankhead 
Highway to the point where United States High- 
way 41 crosses the Chattahoochee River. Johnston 
crossed the Chattahoochee on July 10, covered and 
protected, in the words of Sherman, "by the best 
line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, pre- 
pared long in advance." Sherman crossed his 
army over the Chattahoochee and soon faced the 
Confederates behind their first line of intrench- 
ments at Peach Tree Creek. At this critical mo- 
ment an important event took place. On the 
evening of July 17 a telegram from Richmond was 
received by Johnston relieving him of command of 



the Confederate Army facing Sherman in front of 
Atlanta, and substituting Gen. John B. Hood, who 
assumed command the following day. 

Hood planned to attack at once, and on July 20, 
about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, his troops left 
their intrenchments and attacked the Federal 
troops while they were in motion attempting a 
crossing of Peach Tree Creek. Federal artillery 
had been massed at a point near the present bridge 
over the stream along Peach Tree Road, prepara- 
tory to crossing it in the Federal advance. The 
Confederate attack struck here first. The Federal 
troops drawn up on the ridge along which Collier 
Road in Atlanta runs today, with no trenches, met 
and repulsed the attack. The fighting was des- 
perate and lasted 4 hours, the troops becoming 
commingled and engaging in hand to hand fighting. 
In the end the Confederates were repulsed, and 
they withdrew to their main fortified lines close 
to Atlanta. 

Sherman had determined not to assault the 
intrenched Confederates, but to surround the city 
and to cut all communications, which w^ould force 
Hood into a general attack or compel him to 
evacuate the city. In accordance with this policy, 
Sherman on July 18 started General McPherson 
with a portion of the Federal Army on a route to 




TO ATLANTA - \l.iM 



SCALE IN MILES 



PARK BOUNDARY 

HARD SURFACED ROADS 



K.tNNESAW MOUNTAIN 
NATIONAL BATTLLFILLD PAR.1^ 

MAR,IE.TTA- GEOR,GIA 



the east of Atlanta McPherson struck the Georgia 
Railroad near St6ne Mountain and then turned 
toward Atlanta, tearing up the tracks as he pro- 
ceeded. 

Hood now tried to destroy McPherson's army' 
situated in the vicinity of what are now Moreland 
Avenue and Flat Shoals Road in southeastern 
Atlanta. By a secret night march of 15 miles, a 
portion of the Confederates under General Hardee 
gained a position in the rear of McPherson. With 
Wheeler's cavalry, Hardee launched an attack 
about noon of July 22 that caught McPherson's 
troops entirely by surprise. McPherson himself 
ran directly into a column of Confederate troops 
as he rode hurriedly to investigate the firing. 
Wheeling his horse to escape, he was fired upon as 
he entered a copse of woods. His horse emerged 
riderless. McPherson's death was the greatest 
single loss suff'ered by the Federal Army during the 
Atlanta Campaign. In the meantime, another 
Confederate force was launching an attack on the 
Federal front. The Confederate attacks were not 
well synchronized. That from the rear came first. 
The Federals leaped over to what had been the 
front side of their trenches, turned around, and 
repulsed the attack. Then, as the attack in their 
front developed, they leaped back to their original 
position in their works and repulsed this attack. 
The fighting of July 22, known as the Battle of 
Atlanta, was the hardest of the campaign. Frus- 
trated and defeated, the Confederates returned to 
their intrenchments encircling Atlanta. 



Sherman now began to shift his tioops west of 
Atlanta to cut the Atlanta and West Point and the 
Macon and Western (now the Central of Georgia) 
Railroads. As the Federals were moving, the Con- 
federates on July 28 again struck their exposed 
flank near Ezra Church, where Mozley Park in 
Atlanta is situated today. The attack was repulsed, 
the Confederates suffering heavily. 

After these three battles, fought within a week, 
Sherman effectively had closed all the railroads 
leading into the city except the Macon and West- 
ern and the Atlanta and West Point Railroads. 
He had brought by rail from Chattanooga a bat- 
tery of 4K-inch rifles which easily could reach any 
point in the invested city. This bombardment 
forced citizens to seek refuge in cellars and caves 
dug in railroad embankments. At Whitehall and 
Alabama Streets in Atlanta today can be seen a 
gas lamp post, now repaired, which was shattered 
by an exploding shell. 

Most of the month of August was spent without 
decisive result. Sherman dispatched his cavalry in 
an attempt to destroy the last railroad into the 
city. These efforts failed. "I now became satis- 
fied," Sherman writes, "that cavalry could not, or 
would not, make a sufficient lodgment on the rail- 
road below Atlanta, and that nothing would suffice 
but for us to reach it with the main army." This 
movement was begun August 25, with Jonesboro, 

Federal trenches jacing Little Kennesaw Mountain. Note period 

rail fence and farmhouse construction illustrated by this picture. 

Wartime photograph. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.) 




^%^« 




Public square of Marietta, Ga., at the time of the passage of 
Sherman's army through the town shortly after the withdrawal south- 
ward of the Confederates, following the battles around Kennesaw 
Mountain. Wartime sketch by Theodore R. Davis in Harper's 
Weekly, August 6, 1864. 



20 miles south of Atlanta (United States Highway 
41), the objective. Sherman knew that with the 
capture of this town on the Macon and Western 
Railroad, Hood would be cut off from his base of 
supplies and the city of Atlanta would have to be 
evacuated. In the engagements that ensued 
around Jonesboro on August 31 and September 1, 
the Federal Army made a secure lodgment on the 
railroad and the fate of Atlanta was decided. 

Hood evacuated Atlanta on September 1, and a 
portion of Sherman's army occupied the city the 
following day. The Confederate Army moved 
from Atlanta to Lovejoy Station, where it halted, 
prevented from taking any further immediate ac- 
tion by the necessity of covering Andersonville, 90 
miles south, where 34,000 Federal prisoners were 
held in the largest of the Confederate prison camps. 
The Atlanta Campaign was at an end. Before 
long, preparations were under way for the move- 
ment which was to take the Federal Army from 
Atlanta to Savannah, the March to the Sea. 

The success of the Atlanta Campaign, and of the 



Portion of Sherman's army destroying the Macon Railroad between 
Rough and Ready and Jonesboro, Ga. This was the last railroad 
left entering Atlanta, and its destruction forced the Confederates 
under General Hood to evacuate the city. Wartime sketch from 
Harper's Weekly /or October 1, 1864. 



events in the lower South which subsequently 
derived from it, made the collapse of the Confed- 
eracy almost inevitable, the exact date depending 
upon the success of Grant's operations against Lee 
in Virginia. 

ANDREWS' RAID 

While not part of the Atlanta Campaign, An- 
drews' Raid may be mentioned here briefly because 
of its relation to the section of the country identi- 
fied with the Atlanta Campaign and because of its 
considerable historic interest. 

The first contact of North Georgia with the reali- 
ties of the War between the States occurred in 
April 1862. J. J. Andrews, a citizen of Kentucky, 
together with 21 Federal soldiers, all in civilian 
dress, penetrated Confederate territory and on the 
night of April 11 they reached Marietta, Ga., 
where they spent the night at the Kennesaw 
House, now the Marietta Hotel. This group 
planned to capture a train on the Western and 
Atlantic Railroad and to destroy the railroad 
bridges between Chattanooga and Atlanta, so 
that Federal forces approaching Huntsville, Ala., 
could rapidly march into and capture Chatta- 
nooga, thus paralyzing communications in a large 
portion of the Confederacy. In the spring of 1862, 
Chattanooga was not heavily garrisoned, and this 
plan, although daring, had a chance of success. 

On the morning of April 12, 1862, the raiders 
boarded a passenger train at Marietta, Ga., and 
when the train stopped at Big Shanty, or Kenne- 




saw, so that passengers and crew could obtain 
breakfast, they stealthily uncoupled the locomotive 
and three box cars from the remainder of the train 
and rapidly proceeded northward. 

The conductor of the stolen engine and another 
railroad employee set out on foot after the fleeing 
engine. Soon they found a small flat car pro- 
pelled by poles, which they appropriated for the 
chase. At the Etowah River the two found a 
locomotive, the Yonah, and took along a number 
of Confederate soldiers to aid in the pursuit. 
Arriving at Kingston, a railroad junction, several 
trains were found blocking the progress of the 
Yonah., The conductor, in order to expedite the 
pursuit, abandoned the Yonah, ran around the 
trains which were blocking the way, and com- 
mandeered the William R. Smith, a Rome Rail- 
road locomotive, standing on a siding. With this 
locomotive, the pursuit was continued, but 4 miles 
north, a break in the rails brought it to a halt. 
Afoot again, a run of nearly 2 miles brought two 
of the pursuers in sight of the locomotive Texas, 
headed southward. This engine was halted and 
backed to Adairsville, where its string of freight 
cars was disconnected, and in reverse, the Texas 
took up the pursuit. 

Illustrating the method used by Sherman in destroying railroad 
materials. After tearing up the rails and cross tie timbers, the latter 
were thrown together Jor bonfires, the rails being so placed over the 
piles of ties that they were heated red hot during the burning of the 
ties. Then the rails were twisted around trees and posts to render 
them useless. Wartime photograph. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.) 



So closely did the Confederates follow that An- 
drews and his men had no time to replenish fuel 
and water or to burn the bridges as they had 
planned. At times the locomotives reached a 
speed of 60 miles an hour. After a race of about 
100 miles, at a point north of Ringgold, Ga., the 
captured locomotive, the General, began to lose 
speed as fuel and water were almost exhausted. 
Reversing the General in an effort to wreck the 
Texas, the Federal soldiers abandoned the train 
and dashed into the woods. Most of the party 
were captured, and subsequently Andrews and 7 
of his raiders were executed. A monument has 
been erected at Big Shanty, or Kennesaw, where the 
raid began. The raiders who were executed are 
interred in the Chattanooga National Cemetery, 
where a marble shaft surmounted by a bronze 
replica of the General marks the group of graves. 

Two of the locomotives which participated in the 
Andrews' Raid incident are still in existence. 
The General is the property of the State of Geor- 
gia and is on exhibition in the Union Depot, 
Chattanooga, Tenn. The Texas is owned by the 
city of Atlanta, and may be seen in the Cyclorama 
building in Grant Park in that city. Part of a 
third locomotive which participated in the raid, 
the WUliam R. Smith, is on the grounds of the 
William R. Smith Machine Co. in Birmingham, 
Ala. The boiler and its attachments have been 
preserved; the trucks, cab, and tender are missing. 




Chickamauga and Chattanooga 
National Military Park 

The history of this park is closely associated 
with the Atlanta Campaign, inasmuch as Chatta- 
nooga commanded the approach to the Lower 
South from the west, and its possession by the 
Federal Army made the campaign possible. In 
a literal sense it may be said the Atlanta Cam- 
paign began with the struggle for Chattanooga. 

The Chickamauga and Chattanooga National 
Military Park, at Chattanooga, Tenn., was estab- 
lished in 1890. It is one of the oldest and largest 
of the battlefield parks, embracing approximately 
8,500 acres. 

The various units of Chickamauga and Chat- 
tanooga National Military Park, including the 
battlefields of Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, 
and Missionary Ridge, are all situated on the out- 
skirts of Chattanooga and are readily accessible 
from that city. The top of Lookout Mountain 
affords the best general view of the battlefields 
around Chattanooga. Here is situated the Adolph 
S. Ochs Memorial Museum and Observatory. 
An attendant is on duty there to assist the visitor. 
In addition to the historical interest, there are few 
views in the country more arresting than that from 
the top of Lookout Mountain. From this point 
may be seen the great Moccasin Bend of the 
Tennessee River and picturesque rugged scenery 
reaching away to the far-off blue haze of the 
Cumberland Mountains. 

The park administration building is situated 
near the northern entrance to the Chickamauga 
battlefield, and here a library, museum, and special 
services are available to the visitor. 

The Atlanta Campaign National 
Marker Sites 

By legislation enacted in 1937, Congress directed 
that the route of march of the Confederate and 
Federal forces engaged in the Atlanta Campaign 
should be ascertained and marked. Five sites, 
Ringgold Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Cass- 
ville, and New Hope Chutch, were designated for 
special marker treatment. 
Small tracts of land have been acquired at ap- 



propriate locations at each of the sites through the 
efforts of public spirited citizens of the State of 
Georgia, and here parking areas and overlook 
developments have been provided. At each place 
a bronze national historic site marker has been 
erected. Also, bronze marker tablets illustrating 
and interpreting the main movements of the 
armies in the vicinity of each of the sites have been 
incorporated in the overlook developments. The 
Work Projects Administration of the State of 
Georgia cooperated in completing the work at the 
several sites. The national marker sites at Ring- 
gold Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, and 
Cassville are immediately adjacent to United 
States Highway 41, the main traveled road 
between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The New 
Hope Church national marker site is situated on 
Georgia State Highway 92, 13 miles southwest of 
Acworth. It can be reached also by proceeding 
17 miles west from Marietta on Georgia State 
Highway 120. 

Kennesaw Mountain National 
Battlefield Park 

Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefikld 
Park has been administered by the National Park 
Service since 1933. As a result of congressional 
action in 1935 and 1939 the battlefield park has 
grown from a small reservation of 60 acres at 
Cheatham's Hill, acquired by a group of Union 
soldiers in 1899, to a battlefield area of about 
3,000 acres, including the principal points of com- 
bat, on most of which the fortifications constructed 
during the battle are well preserved. 

The park administration building is situated 
2 miles north of Marietta at the point where 
United States Highway 41 passes the northern 
tip of Kennesaw Mountain. A collection of maps, 
photographs, and relics in the administration 
building are helpful to the visitor in interpreting 
the Atlanta Campaign. Here library facilities 
and guide services are available to the public. 
Organizations or groups will be given special 
services if arrangements are made in advance with 
the superintendent. Communications concerning 
the park should be directed to the Superintendent, 
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, 
Marietta, Ga. 



15 



UNIVERSITY C 



MGIA LIBRARIES 




U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942